Risk Management strategies in a highly uncertain environment: undesrtanding the role of common unknown by Kokshagina, Olga et al.
Risk Management strategies in a highly uncertain
environment: undesrtanding the role of common
unknown
Olga Kokshagina, Pascal Le Masson, Benoit Weil, Patrick Cogez
To cite this version:
Olga Kokshagina, Pascal Le Masson, Benoit Weil, Patrick Cogez. Risk Management strate-
gies in a highly uncertain environment: undesrtanding the role of common unknown. 19th
International Product Development Management Conference, Jun 2012, Manchester, United
Kingdom. <hal-00734100>
HAL Id: hal-00734100
https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00734100
Submitted on 20 Sep 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN A HIGHLY UNCERTAIN 
ENVIRONMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF COMMON UNKNOWN 
Olga KOKSHAGINA
1,2
, Pascal LE MASSON
1
, Benoit WEIL
1
, Patrick COGEZ
2
  
olga.kokshagina@mines-paristech.fr 
(1)
MINES PARISTECH, CGS - Center for scientific management 
60 Boulevard Saint-Michel, 75272 Paris Cedex 06, France 
 
(2)
Technology R&D, STMicroelectronics, Crolles, France 
850, rue Jean Monnet 
F-38926 Crolles Cedex 
KEYWORDS 
Risk management, uncertainty, common unknown, project portfolio, platform core, platform 
derivatives 
ABSTRACT 
This work deals with strategies of risk management techniques in projects and 
portfolios in the situation of radical innovation. Existing literature suggests different methods 
of risk management: 
1. Risk minimization at the level of project (S1). These strategies lead to minimize 
unknown by selecting a priori the less uncertain projects, depending on the identified 
market risks and technological risk.  
2. Risk minimization at the level of portfolio consists in using an existing platform core 
(minimal system) to construct several options (S2). This strategy increases chances to 
succeed not by selecting one single, most probable project but by increasing the size 
of the sample, maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of derivatives.  
These methods consider different level of uncertainties and are independent from each 
other. Apart from working on different objects (projects or platform derivates) and using 
different criteria for risk management, they require various competences from managers and 
different observation techniques. 
In breakthrough situations, it is hard to distinguish the management level in between 
projects and portfolios since the object itself is not defined. To the best of our knowledge in 
the context of risk management, the link in between literature on uncertainty projects 
management (S1) and platform management for risk minimization (S2) in radical situations 
doesn’t exist. In practice the tendency is to fabricate exploration project that follows S1’ type 
strategy that is reused as a platform core to address modules of platform after (S1’ followed 
by S2, (S1’, S2’ – derivatives of S1, S2 in radical contexts)).  
We will show that thanks to our literature review there exists another strategy (S3) of 
working on “common unknown” of multiple options but its managerial implementation is not 
obvious.  
By testing the proposed framework in two cases of Advanced R&D (explorative 
phase of new technologies development for unknown markets with fixed budget) in 
semiconductor industry, we compare identified S3 strategy with existing S1’ lead by S2’. The 
paper demonstrates that management of “common unknown” is possible and could be 
implemented in the context of largely unknown exploration. 
The proposed strategy of working on common unknown opens a new way to portfolio 
risk management in the context of radical innovation. Using S3 framework of knowledge gap 
identification to construct common unknown core, company can build its innovative 
capabilities through knowledge management and better position to innovate in emerging 
fields.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Management of radical innovations is followed by enormous challenges in terms of 
risks and uncertainty management. How to manage risks when the exploration is in the case 
of both unknown technology and unknown markets? One would say that it is extremely 
difficult to proceed in chaos and the exploration is unmanageable. 
Let’s take a look at concrete worldwide accepted problem of energy harvesting. For 
society it is well recognized that there is a clear need and the solution will come in a certain 
technological variety of applications. Energy harvesting is one of well known examples of so 
called technological lock-in (i.e., Arthur, 1989). The lock-ins are common problems that 
various industries are facing, their solving is considered to be advantageous for a lot of 
different communities but solutions are not found yet. Even if for society the need in energy 
harvesting is known and well spread in between different actors, from innovators point of 
view, both final forms of market applications and technologies are highly uncertain. Ex post 
this situations appears to be technological lock-ins and solution that will be created as a 
common resource. Ex ante the only thing we can argue for is the existence of common 
unknown. However, the nature of this common unknown is undefined; we don’t know what 
would be the future technological core and which market will be behind. Nevertheless, we 
know that this lock-in will be common for several markets that don’t exist yet. Is it possible 
to take into account these common emerging needs in technological solutions and reduce 
risks of exploration based on these common aspects?  
Even if each market has a very low probability of occurrence, it is doubtful that none 
of them will emerge at the end. Supposing we have 20 independent emergent niche markets 
with probability of occurrence inferior 10%. The probability of at least one market existence 
at the end is equal to 1" (1" 0.1)
20
= 0.878 . The condition for set of emerging markets to 
succeed is the common interest in between them, a common core. But the challenge is to 
manage risks on the project that addresses these needs. 
Could technological lock-ins be a form of object to manage in between society needs 
(potential markets) and innovators that allow reducing risks by exploring double unknown? If 
yes, how do we identify it? What could be the management logic of concept of technological 
lock-in? 
How did they manage steam engine that was an enormous lock-in back in the history? 
What about invention of worldwide spread plastics? Definitely there is a possibility to discuss 
lock-ins ex post, but is there possible to manage them to reduce risks of exploration? For 
example for energy harvesting, how can we identify lock-in? Is it a form of energy control, 
transformation or storage? The lock-in is a common interest in this case that allows defining 
the nature of object to manage, a common unknown. Therefore we are interested in risk 
management strategies that allow working on common unknown.  
Literature highlights two strategies of risk management situations, which have a 
tendency to manage, or unknown or common knowledge: 
1. Logic of risk management that considers projects independently (S1). On the level of 
project there is a tradition of uncertainty diagnosis and risk reduction for pre-defined 
problem (uncertainty reduction or variation in problem formulation in De Meyer et 
al., 2002; Loch et al., 2008; Sommer et al., 2009, etc.). S1 lead to minimize unknown 
by selecting a priori the less uncertain projects, depending on the identified market 
risks and technological risk. Risks are managed by the project leader. The criterion of 
“good” risk management is the high probability of success of the project. These 
strategies deal with projects independently and do not consider common. 
2. By comparison, risk management strategies in portfolio (S2) try to take into account 
common aspects in between projects. The example of this is a portfolio represented by 
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a technological platform core and its derivatives. The module considered to be 
defined once the market signal is sufficient enough to conceive it (Baldwin 2008, 
Baldwin and Clark, 1997, O’Connor et al., 2008, Gawer and Cusumano, 2008, etc.)) 
(S2). This strategy increases chances to succeed not by selecting one single, most 
probable project but by increasing the size of the sample, i.e. by being able to play 
several options, maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of derivatives. 
Risks are managed by the portfolio manager or the platform manager. The criterion of 
“good” risk management is the aggregated profitability of the portfolio (or platform). 
This strategy works on common, but it is limited to common already known aspects in 
between projects. 
This literature review allowed defining general framework of risk management: 
objects and nature of risks, actors responsible for risk management and their competence, 
criteria, and resources necessary to manage risks. We’ve found out that both defined 
strategies are contrasted since they don’t deal with the same objects (project vs. platform), 
they are not managed by the same actors (project manager vs. platform leader), require 
different resources and not based on the same evaluation criteria (success of one single 
project vs. aggregated successes of multiple projects). They don’t treat common unknown. 
When it comes to managing the unknown (i.e., technological lock-ins) can one reuse 
these strategies of risk management? In highly uncertain situations (breakthrough, radical, 
disruptive, major, etc.), S1 might be impossible, because all projects are too risky and S2 
might be impossible because there is no platform available to play several times with limited 
costs. The literature shows that we have a tendency to fabricate exploration project that 
follows S1’ type strategy that is reused as a platform core to address market derivatives in 
this case (S1’ followed by S2, (S1’, S2’ – derivatives of S1, S2 in radical contexts)). Don’t 
these strategies attempt to fabricate common unknown as a support for risk management 
strategies in radical innovation?  Thus, can one propose risk management strategy based on 
common unknown management (S3)? How can we characterize them and compare 
alternative strategies S3 and combination of S1’ and S2’ based on the defined framework of 
risk management? These are precisely our research questions. 
Based on literature review, we attempt to define what can be risk management 
strategies based on common unknown. The purpose is to characterize strategies able to treat 
risks in double unknown situations.  
These questions are not just theoretical, it is crucial to manage risks in high 
uncertainty environment for high-tech companies. Where should we study our questions? 
There should be high probabilities of technological lock-ins existence (i.e, various nature of 
technological problems, challenging competition environment, worldwide spread, etc.), 
volatile uncertain markets and tremendous amount of potential applications. A priori, in 
semiconductor industry double unknown situations are not rare. Innovative project teams 
have to be aware of unknown technologies and commercial aspects in dynamic environment 
of advanced technology development, take into account emerging society needs and manage 
technological lock-ins. 
In STMicroelectronics (STM), leading European Semiconductor Company, the 
identification and the development of new technologies is primarily the responsibility of 
research teams within Technology R&D group. We conduct our case studies at 
STMicroelectronics, in research units that don’t follow classical rules of R&D Management. 
These groups are not working in the stream of technological effort of “More Moore” (Moore, 
1965). Based on The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors group (ITRS), 
this pattern is called “More than Moore” and “Beyond CMOS”. There are neither clear 
scientific question, neither well defined decision to develop new products based on 
exploration and targeted markets. There is high level of uncertainty both on the level of 
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technology and future markets. Often advanced research initiatives suffer to be accepted by 
divisions just because they appear to be too risky and conventional marketing risk assessment 
methods don’t justify investment to potentially innovative solutions. 
The paper is organized as following. First, we present existing risk management 
strategies based on literature review and we propose an analytical framework to define and 
compare them based on: objects, actors and their competence, criteria, and resources 
necessary to manage risks. Using proposed framework, we characterize strategies that treat 
double unknown situation and propose a potentially new strategy of working on common 
unknown (S3). Second, we present chosen research methodology and we analyze risk 
management strategies in empirical cases of advanced technology development in 
semiconductor industry in the situation of double unknowness. We identify which strategy of 
risk management team used through exploration. Finally, we explain the limits and 
advantages of risk management methods used in advanced technology exploration cases. The 
article closes with managerial implications of common unknown strategy and directions for 
further research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Literature and Analytical framework presentation based on strategy of risk 
minimization at the level of projects and its illustration with platform based strategy 
In the literature strategies of risk management at the level of projects are well 
presented. (Sanchez et al., 2009) showed that project risk management is a well developed 
domain in comparison to the program risk management and portfolio risk management fields. 
They stated that for portfolio management it is hard to find particular written methodologies. 
In portfolios usually we pilot risks case by case without considering influence of project 
dependencies in overall portfolio performance. 
The risk management methods based on uncertainty reduction for identified projects 
are well represented (a lot of work deals with studies on how decision makers cope with 
uncertainties (i.e., Lipchitz and Strauss, 1997; Chapman, 1990; projects with variations and 
foreseeable uncertainties in De Meyer et al., 2002), etc.). Risk management includes 
techniques to either increase probability of occurrence of an event or increase its impact on 
the project (or decrease in case of negative risks) (Petit, 2011). These strategies lead to 
minimize unknown by selecting a priori the less uncertain projects with higher probability of 
occurrence, depending on the identified market risks and technological risk. The level of 
uncertainty allows prioritizing corresponding markets (based on market probability) and 
selects a project associated with maximal economic performance (i.e., Expected NPV, 
Discounted Cash Flow). The risk management is concentrated on addressing uncertainties 
associated with project feasibility, market, technology, financial aspects, organizational, etc 
(Ward and Chapman, 2003).  
We analyze risk management strategy that treats risks based on singular projects (S1). 
In S1 strategy to manage risks one need to know probability of occurrence/success of 
identified alternatives to be able to prioritize them and select the most favourable project. 
Marketing should be able to prioritize markets and predefine a dominant one to address. 
Thus, the resources needed for project risk management are information based on functions, 
targeted clients, and technical specification. The criterion of “good” risk management is the 
high probability of success of the project and maximum expected value of identified project 
with controlled budget. The risk management is concentrated on addressing uncertainties 
associated with project feasibility, market, etc. Risks in S1 should be managed by the project 
leaders that are capable to define and calculate information based on probability of success of 
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different solutions, to reason based on both technical and market planning. We consider that 
the cost of projects exploration is limited by predefined budget of R&D.  
Based on strategy of risk minimization at the level of project, we propose a 
framework of risk management strategy one needs to: 1) establish the context: identify the 
object of risk itself; 2) identify management criteria; 3) define necessary information to be 
able to manage risks; 3) choose actor/s responsible for managing and the required level of 
competence. Therefore, we use this managerial framework to describe and compare identified 
risk management strategies. For S1 strategy characterization based on four identified 
comparative criteria see table 1.  
Whereas S1 considers projects independently and leads to select more valuable one. 
The second family of strategies take advantages of interdependencies in between projects. 
For instance, in case of modularization (Baldwin and Clark 1997, 2004) propose to reuse 
platform core that helps to address various options that are depending on it. (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2004) showed how to obtain several available options thanks to common platform. 
Platforms represent a core of technological system and have to be interdependent with other 
parts of the system (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). According to platforms typology (Gawer 
2010), we deal with internal, inside firm platforms in this paper. Reusing platform core 
attempts to minimize risks by constructing several options (Baldwin and Clark, 2004) (S2).  
In S2 strategies initial platform core is considered to be available. The objective is to 
construct market derivatives based on common core. There exist a list of modules with equal 
rather low probability (not possible to prioritize projects), so one can play several options. 
Each option attempts to address different market derivative maximizing the total economic 
value of the portfolio of derivatives. The probabilities of market derivatives are usually low 
and therefore they are not attractive from S1 strategy point of view.  
Expected value of the system is the aggregated profitability of the portfolio (or 
platform). Aggregated cost value of market derivatives development has to be slightly low 
and reuse maximally already existing platform core.  Each option attempts to address 
different market derivative maximizing the total economic value of the portfolio of 
derivatives. Cost of portfolio exploration is predefined by budget of R&D project. Portfolio 
manager has to know well the platform to identify derivatives. He has to manage the portfolio 
of options and probability that the set of chosen options is profitable. The information needed 
for platform driven strategy is based on existence of platform core and cost of each options 
development (for S2 characterization see table 1 below).  
Table 1 Strategies comparison 
Risk 
management 
strategy 
Objects to 
manage 
Actors Criteria Resources 
S1 Project Project manager 
capable to evaluate 
potential value, has 
marketing and 
technological 
expertise 
High probability 
of success of 
identified project 
Expected Project 
Value 
Information based 
on: functionality of 
project, technical 
principles and 
future users, etc. 
S2 Portfolio of 
projects 
(derivatives 
created by 
platform 
core) 
Portfolio manager 
that knows common 
core and able to 
define options and 
test them with low 
cost 
Aggregated 
expected value 
of portfolio 
Platform core and 
cost of associated 
options 
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We see that both S1 and S2 deal with various uncertainties (mostly variation, 
foreseeable uncertainties). Interestingly enough, they are actually much contrasted since they 
don’t deal with the same objects (project vs. platform), they are not managed by the same 
actors (project manager vs. platform leader) and not based on the same evaluation criteria 
(success of one single project vs. aggregated successes of multiple projects). 
When it comes to highly uncertain situations (breakthrough, radical, disruptive, major 
innovation, etc.), S1 might be impossible, because all projects are too risky. One still could 
make hypothesis (in case of unforeseeable uncertainty (De Meyer et al, 2002)) based on 
estimated probabilities of success, that normally change significantly at the end of projects. 
S2 strategy might be impossible because there is no platform available to play several times 
with limited costs. In addition, existing literature on product platforms assumes that the 
platform leader knows the final use of products and is capable to develop these new products 
(Gawer, 2010). This is definitely not the case in the context of radical innovation when both 
the selection of platform core and final products use are highly uncertain. 
Risk management strategies in double unknown 
We call this case double unknown because there is both a difficulty to predefine 
dominant market that can be achieved with associated budget and there is a need of 
technological effort to develop platform. This is a case where we have both disruptive and 
breakthrough (radical) innovation at the same time, similar to major innovation (Rice et al. 
2008). In these situations risk management is really critical and it is difficult to distinguish if 
one has to choose a strategy on the level of portfolio or projects. (O’Connor et al, 2008; 
Paulson et al, 2007) showed that in high uncertainty firms cannot rely as much on existing 
knowledge as they can in known markets. Uncertainties associated with radical innovation, 
which requires knowledge creation and application in novel contexts. The risks and 
unknowns are so high that any Discounted Cash Flow, Net Present Value, or Internal Rate of 
Return has to be discounted at such a high rate that project or portfolio managers will never 
accept their too small values (O’Connor, 2006). They indicate that the effectiveness of 
approaches firms use to manage risk and uncertainty in radical innovation activities is not 
explicitly addressed. 
Various researchers are interested in the way of discovering, managing approaches to 
double unknown (Loch et al. 2006, Mullines 2007, Krishnan et al. 2002). Innovation journeys 
(Van de Ven et al. 1992), Discovery-driven planning (McGrath and McMillan, 2009), 
information gap decision theory (Ben-Haim 2001) diagnosis of unforeseeable uncertainties 
(Loch et al. 2006 etc.), R&D 2 and marketing 2 (Miller and Morris 1999); (Roussel 1991), a 
real options approach (O’Connor et al., 2008) propose ways to address double unknown. In 
real options approach the manage can be based at the level of projects where we explore less 
risky options to better valorise the project and optimize investments (S1’ type). At the same 
time we can work at portfolio level that able to identify new options, find unexpected market 
(type S2’). So we have strategies in between S1’ and S2’. So we characterize real options 
approach in between S1’ and S2’ (S1’ followed by S2, (S1’, S2’ – derivatives of S1, S2 in 
radical contexts)). What about other identified strategies of management in high uncertainty?  
(Loch and al. 2008) provide an overview of existing research on unforeseeable 
uncertainty. By showing that traditional risk planning techniques are insufficient for 
management of unforeseeable uncertainty, they suggested that the final method depends on 
the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty and complexity of the problem. Their work 
proposed a complementary model for diagnosis of unforeseeable uncertainty by learning 
problem structure and decomposing the problem. Then by studying each sub problem and 
isolating pieces by uncertainty they select a trial-and-learning, selectionism or plan-and-
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achieve target methods. They successfully implemented this strategy to Escend Technology 
start-up. 
This research work summarized two fundamental approaches for management of 
uncertainty:  
• Trial-and-learning approach (Pitch et al. 2002, Van de Ven et al. 1999; Lynn et al. 
1998) that consists in iterative trying of selected trials and flexible changes in the 
course of action 
• Selectionism (Lenfle, 2011, Pitch et al., 2002, McGrath, 2001) consists of launching 
multiple trials in parallel and then selecting the best approach later. Selectionism is 
often considered to be more expensive and is affordable to use for big problems. 
Usually selectionism is less time consuming than probe and learning and more 
suitable for market driven approaches that need faster response.  
 
Based on the framework proposed by (Loch et al., 2008), we can rediscuss identified 
before risk management strategies in case of double unknown situation: 
• Trial-and-learning strategy as innovative problem driven approach is based mostly on 
S1’ because it suggests a process of diagnosing unforeseeable uncertainty by defining 
the object, problem and knowledge gaps to test potential unknowns (S1’). It provides 
a certain transformation of initial situation of high uncertainty by formulating the 
problem and integrating the knowledge. But trials don’t just decrease uncertainties, 
they allow opening new possibilities and knowledge accumulation. This knowledge 
creates a platform of accumulated expertise that can be used in the next trial. We 
don’t have real S2’ platform core that address several options, but trials improve 
platform itself. It is similar to simultaneous management of S1’ and S2’. Interaction 
of S1’ and S2’ consists of working on concept of common core even if it is not in the 
heart of associated risk management strategy. Implicit common core of accumulated 
knowledge makes these strategies pertinent to manage double unknown. The 
developed core in S1’ strategy then can be reused as a platform core in S2’ which is 
based on potential modules exploration. We call this strategy as (S1’ -> S2’: trial and 
learning followed by selectionism or Selectionism type S1’ – S2’). The reasoning 
similar to combination of risk management strategies found in (O’Connor et al., 2006, 
Van de Ven et al. 1992, McGrath and McMillan, 2009, etc.) 
• If we came back to selectionism strategies, we deal with independent equal 
alternatives.  We consider this strategy as project driven at the level of portfolio when 
dependencies are not taken into account (type S1’ on the level of independent projects 
in the portfolio). Selectionism is S1’ type for all the identified alternatives in high 
uncertainty. Logic of risk management consists of launching several alternatives in 
parallel that often will increase the budget but not decrease uncertainties. 
Both these strategies work implicitly on common core. Based on existing methods, we 
saw that there is (S1’ -> S2’) risk management strategy that treats common core as a result of 
uncertain projects exploration. The identified common core serves as a base of successive 
explorations. Empirically (Loch et al. 2008, Sommer et al., 2009, 2010) used combination of 
probe and learn and selectionism method of launching parallel trials in application of Escend 
Technology start-up. (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995) showed how generational platforms 
were able to coexist within the Walkman product family consequently (S1’) and support the 
development of important sub-families (S2’). 
We introduce the second family of strategies that don’t obtain common core as a 
result of exploration, but working directly with common unknown as an object to conceive 
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and manage (S3). In S3 we have a tendency to pay exploration phase that help to design 
common core fabricated to emerging market derivatives.  
Finally, we have different logics of risk management (look fig. 1): 
1. For independent projects when the level of uncertainty: 
a. low to be able to prioritize different alternatives and select one  - Risk 
minimization at the level of projects (S1) 
b. high to be able to select alternatives at the beginning of exploration. 
Therefore one has to launch several alternatives to minimize unknown and 
then select a final solution ex post - Selectionism type S1 
2. For interdependent projects  
a. With existing common platform 
i. Risk management in portfolio and managing dependencies in between 
projects by reusing existing platform core to address various options – 
Platform driven (S2) 
b. With unknown common platform 
i. Logic that treats common platform core as a result of project 
exploration (S1’) and then use it a base to address multiple options 
(S2’) –Trial and learning. 
ii. Logic that treats common core as a target of exploration. It leads to 
design common unknown to explore and construct platform core 
based on identified knowledge gaps – Platform as common unknown 
(S3). 
 
Fig. 1 Risk management strategies classification 
This framework leads to propose another topology of « unknown » based on 
interdependencies and known-unknown commons to manage. 
In the following we are interested in comparing S3 and S1’->S2’ strategies based on 
identified analytical framework (see table 2). 
So we have S1’ –>S2’ strategy that allows to minimize risks in high uncertainty. In 
this strategy platform appears as a result of project investigation in S1’. In the first phase of 
S1’ is hard to prioritize markets. However, we still can prescribe subjunctive probabilities in 
order not to select dominant market but estimate which of them can be less risky and more 
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accessible for future derivates in options construction after (i.d., which project has a potential 
to be platform core). The developed core in S1’ strategy then is reused as a platform core in 
S2’ which is based on potential modules exploration to construct platform based S2’ in high 
uncertainty.  
In these strategies we have double risks: we accumulate uncertainty relative to project 
selection and developing platform core and risks associated to derivatives management. In 
addition, there is a risk that S1’ will not result in a platform accessible by market options. For 
project manager in S1’ there are the same risks as in S1, just it is much more challenging to 
identify project without relevant markets distribution. Regarding cost of exploration, there is 
a high uncertainty in budget required for S2’ based on how well S1’ was identified and 
managed. If S1’ gives a platform accessible for already identified options, portfolio manager 
has competence to pilot proposed platform core and associate it with valuable options, 
otherwise the cost of adaption could lead to expensive and risky development. The 
information needed for risk management in this case is based on project identification in S1’ 
to define platform. To choose less risky project for future platform core one needs hypothesis 
on the level of probability distribution for identified project. The resources needed for S2’ 
will be developed in S1’ consequently. The actors responsible for management are the same 
as in S1 and S2. However, while we can identify platform only after project exploration, there 
could be a lack of competence needed to address future derivatives and identify them (see 
table 2). 
While S1’ and S2’ deals with platform creation based on exploration to address future 
modules, there exists a strategy that allows starting not by project to create platform core, but 
by platform derivatives by prescribing various options in double unknown to construct 
common core in between different options.  The future platform is designed to assure 
exploration. We call this strategy “common unknown”. Usually this strategy is not interested 
since we consider that we can define neither options, nor platform core in double unknown. 
We suggest that in double unknown in early stages of innovation exploration it is possible to 
define concept that creates connections in between optional market derivatives. Definitely, it 
requires certain strategic vision of industry from both marketing and technical prospective. 
While working in common unknown one has to be able to define not just potentially 
interesting options to address, but to define as well the voids and knowledge gaps in between 
these options that can lead to future “common unknown” to create and design flexible and 
innovative platform core. While reasoning in common unknown construction for identified 
options, we could avoid risks related to unsuitable platform that has to be modified each time 
for particular option. There are clearly some advantages of S3 strategy but is it manageable? 
How can we define S3 strategy using the proposed managerial framework? What is precisely 
the common unknown to manage? Can one reuse the same risk management criteria as in S1’ 
and S2’? What are resources necessary to introduce S3 strategy and who are the actors 
capable to reason in double unknown to construct common unknown? (see table 2) 
In the following we attempt to define S3 strategy based on the managerial framework 
and compare the strategies based on empirical cases of advanced technology development in 
semiconductor industry. More particularly we are looking for limitation, applicability criteria 
of each strategy. We aimed at testing if there are cases of technology development that can 
use strategy S3. 
Table 2 Strategies comparison in high uncertainty 
Risk 
management 
strategy 
Objects to 
manage 
Actors Criteria Resources 
S1’-> S2’ 1.Project used 
as common 
Project and 
portfolio 
Expected value 
of project 
Prioritized list of 
projects/markets to 
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unknown 
 
2.Platform 
derivatives 
managers exploration 
 
Aggregated 
value of portfolio 
derivatives 
identify S1’ project 
S3 Which form of 
common 
unknown are 
we able to 
manage?  
Which actors are 
able to manage 
common 
unknown? 
Which criteria to 
select for risk 
management 
strategy? 
What are the 
prerequisites to 
launch S3? 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This work is based on a long term partnership of Mines ParisTech and 
STMicroelectronics. Research problematic of “portfolio management in the innovative 
context” was identified as relevant for both practitioners and researches (Hatchuel 2001). The 
empirical study was designed as a collaborative case study (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Shani 2007). We aimed at testing existing and formulating new hypothesis. The empirical 
study is based on two technology development cases. 
For this empirical study the primary source of data were regular and frequent semi-
structured interviews. This work was conducted over 8 months period from (November 2010 
– June 2011). Each example of technology development was constructed as a portfolio of 
Collaborative R&D projects, PhD thesis, and business unit development projects. We 
organized interviews specialists participating or leading technology development from R&D 
technology and design unites, business divisions, former PhD students and some associated 
external research centres. Overall around 40 interviews were performed. The analysis was 
completed by the scope of documents as European projects reports, research presentations, 
and thesis manuscripts, database of thesis project descriptions. In addition, data analysis was 
followed by seminars with company managers (not necessary participating in technology 
development) to discuss the project, to test the validity of our hypothesis and enrich our 
propositions. 
Research method 
We identified strategies that allow working on «common unknown », to 
define unknown interdependencies in between projects to construct platform core. Knowing 
the possible risk management strategies in exploration of unknown, it is challenging to define 
future unknown objects, describe common in between projects that don’t exist yet. Which 
form it should take? How to find common knowledge gap? Which method can be used in this 
case?  
To help identify knowledge creation and follow the cognitive process of innovation, 
we use a most recent theory of design reasoning - C-K theory (Hatchuel and Weil 2003, 
2007, 2009, Hatchuel 2009). This analytical framework will allow describing concepts 
possibly related to future objects. It has already been successfully used in several empirical 
cases (Elmquist and Le Masson 2009; Elmquist and Segrestin 2007; Ben Mahmoud-Jouini et 
al. 2006, etc.)  
We conduct our reasoning based on C-K design theory (Hatchuel and Weil 2003, 
2007, 2009, Hatchuel 2009). C-K is a general theory of design reasoning based on distinction 
in between propositions and novel objects (called Concepts) and their interaction with known 
objects (called Knowledge). Starting by defining initial concept, design leads to transform 
undecidable propositions in C space into true propositions in K space. During design process 
C and K expands jointly through the action of design operators. However, when several 
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projects depend on development of particular technology, we can construct hypothesis around 
this core technology and allow developing application core simultaneously. This is exactly 
what we consider as common unknown, as common voids in knowledge space that we 
explore. 
To identify platform core to develop based on available or future knowledge, we need 
to structure K-space to find dependencies in between pieces of projects, challenges, modules, 
etc. We reuse a notion of models in K-space proposed by (Kazakci 2009, Kazakci et al. 
2010). The authors use graph formalism to describe type of objects and systems of related 
objects. Set of objects related to each other is introduced as Knowledge Island (fig. below, 
adapted from Kazakci et al. 2010). In the model Learning consists of adding new relation 
between two existing objects to the knowledge graph. They represented concepts as voids – 
couples of nodes that are not connected by any chain of relations. 
 
Fig. 2 C-K design theory with K-space structure (adapted from (Kazakci 2009)) 
Identified in the previous part risk management strategies require different ways of 
structuring knowledge space: 
• S1 leads to voids identification and unknown exploration relative to particular chosen 
voids (fig. 2). 
• S2 is based on knowledge connection in between different knowledge islands (K 
space on the fig. below). We reason based on existing knowledge. For Knowledge 
Island 1, the dependencies are indentified with knowledge block (modules 7). 
Independently, Knowledge Island 2 is interdependent with 7. Based on these 
identified interdependencies we reuse common core (platform core around project 7) 
and treat new options after all. Reasoning here is Knowledge-driven and based on 
Common core creation for platform construction (fig. 3). 
• The mixed S1’ -> S2’ strategy leads to fist to develop 7 that has a potential to fulfil 
voids. Fulfilled voids connect constructed common core with identified “knowledge 
island”. In the S2’ phase, the reasoning is based on multi-options creation based on 
platform core S1’ reuse. 
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Fig. 3 K-space in Platform based strategy 
• S3 relates to common unknown creation that relates different knowledge islands 
In S3 there are independent knowledge islands with no identified connections in 
between. Context is largely unknown. We construct the dependencies in between this 
knowledge basis regarding the desired concept «common unknown» that connects future 
options of the portfolio. Reasoning is based on unknown platform creation that is benefiting 
for all identified and future modules. We introduce the notion of common unknown (fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 4 K-space in “Common unknown strategy” 
In the following we use proposed method of knowledge structuring to describe our 
two cases of advanced technology development. 
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Relevant field 
We conduct our case studies at STMicroelectronics, one of the leading semiconductor 
companies, in Advanced R&D research units that don’t follow classical rules of R&D 
Management.  
The relevance of semiconductor industry for radical innovation studies was showed 
by various researchers (ex., Cohen, Levinthan, 1989), especially for knowledge creation 
methods in science-based environments (showed by Le Masson, et al. 2010, 2012) driven by 
“More Moore” Law (Moore, 1965). Strong competition, fast changing environment relevant 
to semiconductor industry lead it to explore not just new technologies, but as well new 
functionalities, creating new products.  
Advanced R&D units in STM don’t follow “More Moore” law. They are subscribed 
in diversification approach that is identified by ITRS as “More than Moore” (ITRS 2007).  
There is neither clear scientific question, neither well defined decision to develop new 
products based on exploration and targeted markets. There is high level of uncertainty both 
on the level of technology and future markets. 
To better understand the question of addressing double unknown platforms we’ve 
chosen two cases of advanced technology developments (Leguay et al., 2011). . 
The first case investigated was Integrated Front End Module (FEM) for mobile phone 
applications using Bulk acoustic wave (BAW) filter technology development. The initial 
challenge was to provide integrated stable FEM solution by integrating filters and duplexers 
directly on the board to cut significantly space, and therefore cost of solution. Even existed, 
the market was new for STM company at that time and innovative technological phenomena 
was identified through research projects. The development of this technology was initially 
managed as S1’ strategy and then the team reused developed platform core following S2’. 
We show that initial problem formulation was not well adapted to common unknown 
management in between different projects. The explorations lead not to convergence but to 
risks augmentation around technology development. The final decision was to abandon 
exploration despite of great results and created value in terms of technology.   
The second case is BICMOSMW (high performance 0.13!m SiGe BiCMOS 
technology, targeting very high-frequency applications) technology platform development 
based on Heterojunction Bipolar transistor (HBT) with unique technology features. Despite 
of the difficulties in defining both future technology and designing market, the team 
succeeded to address several markets simultaneously. First analysis showed that the case was 
not managed completely neither on the level of project based S1’ strategy, nor on the level of 
platforms based S2’. The team leader based the platform exploration in addressing what was 
unknown for all the targeted markets. The dependences were constructed based on common 
unknown (S3) and were managed based on the links to allow exploration. 
We will further describe both cases, identify which logic the technology development 
followed and compare performance of different strategies.  
EMPIRICAL BASIS 
Case description 1. Development of Integrated RF Front-End Module for Mobile 
phones (FEM) 
As was mentioned before this case is based on technology targeting mobile phones 
market. It was initially requested by the customer of STM that were interested in integrated 
FEM solution. STM was already providing a part of FEM, only filter blocks were supplied by 
others. Saturated with Solid Acoustic Waves (SAW) filter technologies (not integrated) at 
that time, it was a new market for STM Company and they look how to differentiate in 
technology to address particular client demand and to create new markets. The R&D group 
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was working from 2002 till 2009 to provide feasible solution. The objective at the beginning 
was to address Integrated Radio Frequency Front-End Module (FEM) for mobile phones (fig. 
5). The objective was to introduce compact integrated filter to provide complete solution. At 
that time the cost of filter application was 30% of the whole FEM. 
 
Fig. 5 Identified integration strategy (STMicroelectronics property) 
They identified BAW technology for this application. BAW technology is based on 
mechanical properties of piezoelectric materials to integrate filters and time reference 
function on Silicon to obtain integrated RF Front-End Module. A BAW resonator is a (Metal-
Insulator-Metal) MIM type capacitor with a piezoelectric material as a dielectric.  
Starting with BAW Solid Mounted Resonator application for filtering technology, in 2005 
research team invented BAW Coupled Resonators Filter (CRF) technology for both 
integrated filter and also time-reference solution application. In addition to Si integration, the 
advanced CRF allowed to achieve size decrease till 0.5 x 0.5 mm
2 
(instead of 1 mm
2 
for 
standard BAW) and reduced IPAD (Integrated passive devices for RF wireless applications) 
surface. 
However, to be industrialized the technology needed special equipments to be 
developed and install in the factory (trimmer machines), which required bigger investment 
that the initially chosen market was ready to pay. The rather complex fabrication process 
needed 110 steps. In 2007 Research team launched collaborative project based on “Compact 
RF filters in BAW technology for the Mobile telecommunication system”. The objective of 
the project was to design and implement future generation RF filters based on BAW 
technology to meet the specification required the mobile phone applications, reduce the cost 
of solution. They anticipated the transfer of technology form laboratory to STM fabs and 
estimated investment cost. The project report states that “Blocking points were not defined”. 
But in 2007 the customer interested in technology initially chose another supplier 
based on SAW technology. To be industrialized the technology needed special equipments to 
be developed and install in the factory, which required bigger investment that the selected 
market was ready to pay. The feasibility study of market and needed investment was done 
only when technology principle was developed; it was too late to test unforeseeable 
uncertainties in the approach of (Loch et al., 2008). Business Unit 1 decided to stop the 
development. 
The broken link with the market brought R&D group to the hard decision whether to 
abandon development or try to reuse results for other possible applications. The research 
group with ongoing projects decided to continue and searched how one can re-use the 
developed phenomena based on BAW. They looked for additional functions that technology 
can address. It allowed proposing to the market Integrated BAW oscillators (synchronized 
time-reference application).  
The proposed technology was smaller than stable Quartz oscillator technology, 
allowing to multi-synchronize the devices in FEM. However, standard Quartz solution is 
more temperature stable and the identified Business Unit 2 have chosen improved Master 
PLL solution based on Quartz technology at the end. 
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Overall, the development of BAW technology lasted eight years. Research team 
developed initially requested technology and introduced the usage of BAW for new 
application; they patented more than 30 ideas around this research effort. It allowed the 
creation of an important ecosystem of laboratories and companies working in the area. The 
portfolio of projects consisted of 11 successfully accomplished PhD projects, 6 European 
collaborative projects and 2 development projects. But both products developed by STM 
never appeared in the market and the development was stopped. 
Case analysis 1. Development of Integrated RF Front-End Module for Mobile phones 
(FEM) 
 
Fig. 2 K-space of BAW technology development (simplified) 
The case was initially managed at the level of projects (S1’). Based on initial 
expertise, client was interested in addressing identified uncertainties at the level of projects. 
Research team started exploration with a pre-defined market application; the void in K-space 
was integration on Si filter functions. The problem was formulated to answer to a particular 
client demand of integrated FEM solution (part 1 in fig. 2). Major functional requirements 
(FRs) were identified and technological phenomena (BAW resonator) to develop were 
chosen based on available knowledge. The research projects were mostly concentrated on 
achieving technological feasibility and improving performance and cost of potential solution 
(development of BAW CRF based filter). The initially formulated assumptions on availability 
of market, net present value, final solution and feasibility of BAW as identified solution 
didn’t allow addressing unknowns. The team developed solution to initially defined 
unknowns but it didn’t allow succeeding in general. 
On the contrary, the investment needed was much higher than initially expected, 
market was not ready to pay, competition level from alternative mature technologies (SAW, 
Quartz, etc.) was not very well addressed, etc. We state that initially formulated problem 
increased risks instead of reducing it. We highlight it as an unexpected effect of risk 
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management in problem driven approach. The initial formulation of problem could have a 
crucial effect on project success; it could lead to useless exploration. 
In the second phase team attempted to reuse properties of BAW for time reference 
application to multi synchronize components in FEM. They attempted to reuse initially 
explored projects as a core to construct platform based on BAW resonator. They transformed 
S1’ strategy to S2’ by fabricate a platform allowing new application. They used platform 
based S2’ strategy to reuse BAW resonator as a platform core to address time-reference 
option. However, constructed common core didn’t minimize risks and didn’t justify the value 
of developed technology. Unknowns addressed in the first phase of technology development 
were poorly reused in the second, they were suitable just for the first identified filter solution.  
The failure of this development can’t be explain by bad project management. 
Considering the high level of economical risks, we argue that the results could be different if 
the team would concentrate in defining common unknown (S3) in order to find necessary 
knowledge to conduct the reasoning. Instead of exploring the context with problem driven 
strategy and then reusing it to construct platform core, they could save time and decrease 
risks by direct platform construction of common unknown (see table 3). Researchers would 
address a problem in a larger way to search more functional requirements for wider amount 
of application, allow exploration on the level of system addressing potentially set of markets 
(constructing “common unknown” around several markets). For example, one of the partners 
of STM later on introduced advanced solution based on BAW and SAW technologies using 
the advantage of both: “EPCOS has now combined strengths of both filter technologies for 
the first time into a single duplexer by using a BAW filter with high power compatibility for 
the transmit filter in combination with low temperature drift and a SAW filter for the receive 
filter” (source: www.epcos.com)(see table 3 for comparison in between S1’ and S2’ formal 
characterization and presented case). 
Table 3 FEM BAW technology development 
 Objects to 
manage 
Actors Criteria Resources 
In case 1 Filter 
development 
 
Time reference 
option 
Technical 
platform 
construction done 
by research team 
with inputs from 
marketing 
divisions 
Value 
Estimation done 
after launch of 
projects  - ROI 
only in 2007 for 
S1’ and for S2’ 
separately 
Done by marketing 
function once for 
filter application - 
platform core reused 
but aggregated value 
of platform wasn’t 
clear 
Case description 2. BiCMOSMW platform development 
Second case that was chosen is technology platform BiCMOSMW (high performance 
0.13!m SiGe BiCMOS technology, targeting very high-frequency applications) (Chantre et 
al., 2010). (Chevalier, 2007) showed that high-speed BiCMOS roadmap is driven, on one 
hand by the increase of the optical communications data rate, and on the other hand by the 
emergence of applications at higher frequencies. It doesn’t follow classical More Moore law. 
Si/SiGeC heterogeneous bipolar transistor (HBT) performances can be pushed forward (with 
significant advantages over CMOS) and applications at ever increasing frequencies carry on.  
In STMicroelectronics, BISMOSMW platform has evolved after several generations 
of technical solutions. Started with BiPx project it leads to BICMOSMW (specifically 
designed to address emerging millimeter-wave applications) and beyond. The history of 
bipolar transistor technology based on SiGe in STMicroelectronics started in 1998 with 0.35 
µm technology for wireless communication (Geynet, 2008). The success of the SiGe HBT 
has come from its compatibility with silicon technology allowing both low-cost and high 
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yield. While bipolar-only technologies are attractive to replace III-V technologies; full benefit 
is obtained by using heterogeneous solution of BiCMOS + CMOS devices. In spite of the 
ever-increasing constraints brought about by integration with CMOS (thermal budget, 
structural issues, etc.), HBT performance was dramatically increased over the past 10 years.  
Till 2002 the group was working on optimization of bipolar transistor for analog 
signal processing to address emerging standard of 60GHz. There was no particular client 
demand at the beginning. The technological basis that was developed was not ready to 
address any market that time and the key technology was based on CMOS. In the following 
2002 the group was analyzing which potential high-volume market and technological effort 
needed to develop to address it while reusing the previous research results on bipolar 
transistor.  
The expert (Technology Line Manager) that initiated technology development was 
looking for a mass market with potentially huge volume to assure return on investment. He 
identified a particular system issue: the Wi-Fi connections in the big public systems like 
airports, train stations, and more generally high-density places with a lot of connectivity 
devices. The current issue was with the standard for Wi-Fi communication (2.5 to 5 GHz), 
the frequency of processing information was too low to ensure connectivity substantial debit 
to each device. 
Thus, one solution was to use a 60GHz Wi-Fi system with a long range (>10m) to 
limit the number of base stations and system complexity. However, this kind of system 
required specific technology: 
1. First, the RF platform must be adapted to mm-Wave 
2. To obtain high-emission power for long range, the current intensity in power 
amplifiers must be high enough. 
3. The base station system must be compatible with the mobile device Tx/Rx system: 
thus, it must be an integrated system for mobile devices and a power efficient system. 
4. The type of information processing is complex and must be managed by a specific 
digital platform. 
5. The Back End of Line must be adapted to mmW and should allow having high 
quality factors for the passive elements. 
Functional requirements of the artificial system contained both high-frequency 
emissions that were addresses by bipolar technology developed in 2000-2002 and helped to 
combine different functional requirements as low power consumption, digital signal 
treatment, covered distance, etc. They reused existing knowledge to construct modules. This 
lead to common unknown identification.  
In the following the technology platform developed (BiCMOSMW) didn’t allow the 
creation of initially identified system. Nevertheless, it served to different applications such as 
automotive radar, optical communications, wireless fast download systems, high speed 
instrumentation and non invasive imaging.  
In this example we‘ve seen that the work was not done on the technology and 
potential market defined at the beginning, Wi-Fi for airport still doesn’t exist. It was an 
artificial concept to reason in common unknown space and it allowed exploring maximum 
functions with fixed budget of R&D and addresses several markets at the same time. 
Case analysis 2. BiCMOSMW platform development 
This case was chosen and is particular interesting in testing double unknown situation. 
The technology developed didn’t follow neither pattern of classical project or portfolio 
management techniques, nor S1’ and S2’ strategies. The success of portfolio development 
can be hardly explained by existing methods. Probably the use if S1’ strategy would lead to a 
successful development of one of these markets or even three of them, but it would definitely 
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take more time. We state this based on hypothesis that in problem driven strategy we attempt 
to stabilize technology or market to test unforeseeable uncertainty. In S2’ logic we fabricate a 
platform core based on available knowledge and then explore independent modules for each 
market.  
In this example the technological phenomena developed addressed maximum 
functions with the particular budget associated to access one market. The final technology 
platform addressed three markets with the cost of exploration equal to one phenomenon 
exploration development. The expert maximized the list of functional requirements (FRs) 
needed to develop choosing market. He tried to activate maximal number of options (fig. 
below).  
 
Fig. 6 K-space of BICMOS9MW technology development (simplified) 
They activated knowledge around each indentified function to construct knowledge 
islands of existing knowledge in order to formulate common system to develop. The final 
system was identified by testing possible dependencies in between all identified options. 
Common unknown was identified as knowledge gap that would connect knowledge islands. 
The reasoning was based on unknown core to manage (S3).  
The expert sort of created an artificial working place in order to conduct exploration 
with maximum functionality and fixed exploration cost. We state that this reasoning could be 
a complementary strategy to construct and manage portfolios in high uncertainty situations at 
least in semiconductor industry. 
Fast changing industry dynamics in semiconductor industry, short term market 
predictions don’t allow defining potential applications for advanced technology development, 
hence we can’t make hypothesis on future value of market. But usually we can prescribe the 
list of future functions that we can attempt to address, identify options based on strategic 
decisions. Functions which are not relevant to one of existing markets but to the set of them, 
we fabricate an artificial exploration space that can be presented as common unknown core 
(ex., BICMOSMW concept for WI-FI in public systems). By using the reasoning described 
above, we list all the potential options; we activate knowledge around each option and define 
knowledge islands. The following step consists in defining the links between different sets of 
knowledge, choosing the dependent knowledge gaps to develop – identifying common 
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unknown to address. The proposed strategy S3 permits to work on double unknown situations 
without fixing concrete market or technology at the beginning (see table 4). 
Table 4 BICMOSMW platform development 
 Objects to 
manage 
Actors Criteria Resources 
Case 2 Concept B9MW 
Market 
derivatives: 
wireless, 
automotive, 
optical 
communication, 
medical etc. 
Expert on the level 
of Techno Line 
Management able to 
reason both on 
common core 
construction and 
options. Research 
engineers working 
on the project were 
mostly not aware of 
common unknown 
Aggregated 
profitability of 
project 
platform 
construction 
plus portfolio 
of derivatives 
Information 
regarding market 
derivatives and 
technical expertise, 
existing knowledge 
to identify common 
knowledge gap in 
between markets  
Case analysis comparison 
Our case studies analysis demonstrates that in two situations we manage different 
objects, actors are not the same, and strategies require different resources and the 
implementation conditions are different as well. We outlined case study where S3 that 
appears to be costly and risky, lead to a successful development. And S1’->S2’ that appeared 
as a natural passage in between project driven exploration that derivatives creation, failed to 
address identified options. 
The first case study was managed as a problem driven strategy S1’ that results to 
platform construction and addressing several options in the second step S2’. In the first phase 
the uncertainties identified were addressed relatively to filter application for FEM project. In 
the second phase, for time reference application they attempted to reuse BAW resonator as a 
common core to minimize risks of portfolio derivatives exploration. However, the 
uncertainties minimized for filter application, were not relevant for time-reference 
application. We showed that unknowns we push to explore in problem driven strategy (S1’) 
were weakly reused in platform driven method (S2’) after due to problem formulation (in 
S1’, S2’). S1’ increase the risk to create irrelevant “unk unks”. They explore the identified 
“unknown” on the level of predefined project. Both S1’ and S2’ are highly dependent on 
predefined context. We showed that the common knowledge basis was not sufficient enough 
to reduce unknown and justify successive exploration in the case of BAW technology 
development. 
The second case corresponds to “common unknown” strategy of double unknown 
management. The reasoning was built on the unknown concept to address applications for 
automotive, wireless, health markets and fast-download simultaneously. The platform was 
design as a common unknown that will connect all these identified emerging applications. 
We demonstrated that the management of “common unknown” is possible and could be 
implemented in the context of largely unknown exploration, which is precisely the case of 
radical innovations. Common needs of various markets appear to be technological lock-ins ex 
post and the solution is a created common resource. But ex ante, they are precisely common 
unknowns to construct, the object to manage in S3. We saw that even if nature of this 
common unknown is undefined and we don’t know precisely what would be future solution 
core and which market will be behind, S3 is still manageable. Nevertheless, we know that this 
lock-ins will be common for several markets that don’t exist yet and we can construct 
exploration based on this common unknown. “Common unknown” strategy avoids 
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hypothesis on associated context. We showed that in the case of identified options we could 
construct future platform core based on interdependencies to develop. Thanks to 
BICMOSMW case study, we were able to characterize S3 strategy based on the proposed 
managerial framework (see table 5). 
Table 6 Risk management strategies comparison in high uncertainty 
Risk 
management 
strategy 
Objects to 
manage 
Actors Criteria Resources 
S1’-> S2’ 1.Project used 
as common 
unknown 
 
2.Platform 
derivatives 
Project and 
portfolio 
managers 
1.Expected value 
of project 
exploration 
2. Aggregated 
value of portfolio 
derivatives 
Prioritized list of 
projects/markets to 
identify S1’ project 
S3 Common 
unknown 
 
Expert in both 
technical and 
economical 
domains capable 
to identify 
knowledge gaps 
Aggregated 
profitability of 
project platform 
construction plus 
portfolio of 
derivatives 
Necessity to reason 
on concept space, 
Identify innovative 
paths and 
accessible common 
unknown wih low 
resources 
 
 
To compare strategies we use two criteria:  1) nature of the controlled risks by 
strategy or no (based on quality of common core) 2) cost of development in case of each 
strategy. 
In terms of performance case studies reveal that S1’->S2’ contains residual risks that 
are not controlled by strategy. These risks are based on the S1’ projects resulted in inadequate 
common core that requires expensive development to address future options. While starting 
the development if S1’, risk manager normally doesn’t take into account future derivatives to 
address, because his primary goal is the success of S1’. This precisely results in rigid 
common core based in S1’ project exploration.  We limit the number of options to address by 
selecting dominant project in S1’.  
The risk management criteria based on uncertainty reduction (max value with min 
deviation) is not explicit for common core strategy. We are dealing with exploration space 
where it is impossible to highlight probabilities for markets and technologies that don’t exist 
yet. Instead, we are increasing the variety of options to play. We construct common unknown 
based on common dependent elements between emerging markets. These dependent elements 
are common functional characteristics for set of various markets. Then common unknown as 
a technological building block to addresses certain specific functions and at the end, residual 
functions that can be addressed in the second time (adaptation). We maximize the variability 
of options to play later in S3. By introducing S3 strategy, we found out that for good risk 
management in double unknown it is necessary not just to minimize uncertainties for selected 
exploration space, but to maximize the variability of future options. This questions existing 
risk management criteria relevancy for highly uncertain situations and need further 
investigation.  
In S1’ –>S2’ strategy one has to pay the cost of project exploration. Depending on the 
first phase, the cost of S2’ can be or slightly small or it can require major adaptation and a lot 
of resources. In BAW case study we saw that the development in S2’ required additional 
resources for S1’ reuse that company was not ready to pay. In S3, one need highly competent 
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actor to reason in double unknown, accessible knowledge base on future clients and voids in 
knowledge to identify accessible with low resources common unknown. Therefore in S3 
there is a risk of common unknown identification which requires preliminary exploration cost 
to construct it. Then, cost of adaptation has to be slightly low to assure the success of 
portfolio itself. In the case of BICMOSMW we saw that its not impossible to manage cost 
under control and S3 lead to successful development. 
DISCUSSION 
We identified original risk management strategies in double unknown that don’t deal 
with the same objects, they are not managed by the same actors, and they require different 
resources and the implementation conditions are different as well. Accordingly to proposed 
managerial framework: 
1. Nature of objects to be managed 
In both strategies we deal with common core. With common core as a result of 
exploration in (S1’ - > S2’) and as an object of exploration in (S3). In S1’ one manages 
project that potentially can be used as a platform core. It is not sure that in sequential 
exploration project in S1’ will be easily reused as a platform core to address various 
identified derivatives in S2’. In S3 we have to identify common unknown to construct core in 
between different options. It is important to mention that S3 doesn’t manage common core in 
between projects in portfolio, but rather in between emerging options. The process of 
common core identification is based on existing technologies and residual unknowns in 
between them to identify functional space that the knowledge gaps could address. There is a 
preliminary phase to build common unknown that is not management of explorative project 
but a conception of potential commons identification in between techniques (to find a good 
target that addresses several potential markets). Projects portfolio can be then constructed 
after all around created concept of common unknown to explore options. To be able to work 
on common unknown, we have to construct reasoning in common “unknown” voids 
identification. We used the help C-K framework and especially models of K-space 
structuring (Kazakci et al., 2010, Kazakci 2009) to conduct reasoning in double unknown. In 
addition to already existing components of K-models like knowledge islands and voids we 
introduced common unknowns. The utilization of C-K framework helped to guide exploration 
in common unknown object and to define options to construct common core. 
2. Actors and required competencies.  
S1’->S2’ can be managed by classical actors (project and portfolio managers) but not 
S3. Common unknown strategy requires an expert in both technical and marketing domains, 
capable to identify knowledge gaps and potential of technology. Both strategies require 
different prerequisites and different competencies. In (S1’ ->S2’) one has to identify potential 
valuable project to create future platform core and then learn and launch several trials. And in 
S3 there is a need of an expert capable to estimate that the future technological core will be 
able to address several markets that are emerging and highly uncertain with minimal cost of 
adaptation. It brings particular usage condition of S3 strategy. Obviously common unknown 
exploration strategy (S3) needs a really high level of expertise to reason in “unknown space”; 
common unknown can be enormously big to address. Despite of the high level of competence 
required for S3 management, we found out that this mode of reasoning is really efficient in 
terms of risk management. It allows to structure knowledge space to define “common 
unknown” and construct platform to design highly uncertain technologies. We saw in the 
second case study the expert who was capable to reason in double unknown. However, to 
organize the common unknown exploration which actors should we choose? Can it be 
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business angels, techno line managers, etc.? Is it just a matter of expertise or one can teach to 
reason in “market – technology” links construction? 
3. Criteria  
Risk management for S1’->S2’ criteria are precisely the combination of S1 and S2 
criteria. In S1’ we use the expected value of project exploration with min deviation – 
expected utility of project value. In S2’ it is aggregated value of portfolio derivatives based 
on common core developed in S1’. Criteria in S3 are based on aggregated profitability of 
both common unknown exploration in S3) and cost of portfolio derivatives development and 
adaptation.  
4. Conditions of implementation and necessary resources.  
Both strategies require low cost of development for portfolio of derivatives. S1’ and 
S2’ requires list of identified prioritized markets to select exploration project in the first 
phase. For S2’ part platform core will be developed by S1’ and one will need to construct 
derivatives reusing this basis. In S3 strategy managers ought to reason in concept space, 
identify innovative common paths. Designed common unknown has to assure minimum 
exploration cost to address each module in S3. If one has to adapt platform core to each of the 
modules after the common unknown strategy will be too expensive.  
Still, even if highlighting major differences in between strategies, the economical 
conditions of S3 are not explicitly addressed. Further research will lead to a better 
investigation of identified common unknown strategy to innovative portfolio management, its 
guidance and more formal analysis of proposed strategy. We need to better understand its 
limits, advantages and criteria of applicability to other type of projects and industries. We aim 
to create analytical model to highlight the influence of industry dynamics to particular 
management strategies and test the interest of emerging strategies to unknown management.  
We illustrated implementation of identified risk management techniques on two cases 
of advanced technology development. While tested the cases in semiconductor industry, more 
particularly in silicon foundry which is research and knowledge creation driven, we saw that 
in early stages of exploration experts can reason on common unknown and identify 
dependencies necessary to connect several options. Definitely, implementation of proposed 
strategy could be limited to certain industry dynamics. As well as final proposals are valid 
only in the specific cases we analyzed. In addition, the further research will examine whether 
identified risk management strategies based on common unknown are limited to 
semiconductor industry or big high-tech companies and whether S3 can be used for 
innovative start-ups management.  
CONCLUSION 
Proposed study contributed to risk management in the case of double unknown when 
technologies and markets are undefined.  
Based on literature review we proposed general framework for risk management 
strategies. This framework lead to precise identified strategies and associated management 
context based on the definition (for results see table 1, 2): 
• The nature of objects to manage 
• Risk management criteria 
• Actors responsible for risk management and their level of competence 
• Resources necessary for strategy management 
Our work highlighted that to manage risks in double unknown, one has to consider the 
common core. Based on way the common core is treated in the situation of radical 
innovation, we distinguished two types of risk management strategies:  
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• The common core as an expected result of exploration (S1’) that leads to successive 
learning and options development (S1’ - > S2’) 
• The common core as a result of working on common unknown as an object of 
exploration itself (S3). 
The managerial framework based on four features (objects, actors, criteria, resources) 
help to characterize both S1’-S2’ and S3. The comparison between both strategies in this 
framework showed also that S3 is particularly relevant when potential markets are equally 
unknown and experts are able to identify voids in their competences, which are common to 
several potential solutions. Conversely it shows that the attractive S1’-S2’ strategy is 
potentially risky when it leads to develop a first project that won’t be a good platform to 
address the following ones. Favoring S1’ (try the less risky project) before S2’ might actually 
lead to increase the global risks instead of decreasing it.  
This work has several managerial implications. First, we introduced a new way of risk 
management in the situation of high uncertainty that deals with common unknown 
management. This strategy requires different competence in managing double unknown, and 
usage of management criteria. The proposed strategy of working on common unknown opens 
a new way to portfolio risk management in the context of radical innovation. This strategy 
aims at knowledge creation but keeps costs under control and maximizes the likelihood of 
being relevant for future markets.  
Second, we found out that evaluation of risk management strategies based on 
uncertainty minimization is not always relevant in the case of double unknown. In the project 
exploration there are residual risks based on reuse developed common core in derivatives 
addressing. By formulating a project in S1’ we could increase risks associated with market 
derivatives instead of reducing it and increase the cost of adaptation. Thus, we maximize 
risks associated with unknown while decreasing risks associated with the selected exploration 
space. Instead, in common unknown strategy experts try to maximize variability of options 
that common unknown will address. The goal is not to manage uncertainty reduction for 
identified exploration based on existing knowledge. The common unknown strategy brings to 
wider exploration space and pushes to knowledge creation. We argue that the good strategy 
of unknown management has to take into account variability of solutions which is precisely 
the logic of S3 strategy. Even if understanding the importance of variability, it is not obvious 
to which extent one has to take diversity of solutions and which conditions are favorable for 
S1’ -> S2’ strategy or S3. Further research will need to better investigate the performance 
criteria of strategies in double unknown management, as well as their limits and advantages. 
Finally, using originally new way of risk management based on knowledge gap 
identification to construct common unknown core, company can build its innovative 
capabilities through knowledge management and better position to innovate in emerging 
fields.  
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